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Trying to Understand Software: Why 
Microsoft v. AT&T Was Mistakenly 
Decided 
Drew J. Koning* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the recent Supreme Court case Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T 
Corp., two contentious issues in patent law jurisprudence collided: 
1) extraterritorial protection of patents, and 2) the patenting of 
software.  The Court’s decision to appreciably limit software 
patent protection is misguided as it fails to account for the 
complexities of patent law as applied to modern technology. 
A patent provides its owner with the right to exclude others 
from utilizing the claimed invention.1  Under U.S. law, if someone 
makes, uses, sells, offers to sell, or imports an infringing invention 
in the United States, that person may be liable for patent 
infringement.2  Section 271(f) of the Patent Act provides patent 
protection for infringement that occurs overseas if a component of 
the patented item is first manufactured in the United States and 
then exported for final assembly abroad.3  This statute is easily 
applied to the manufacture of tangible goods such as gearboxes or 
 
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/ 
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2739.  Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete 
Journal archive. 
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2008; B.Sc. Physics & Astronomy, 
Sheffield University, England, 1998.  Drew Koning was an Informatics & Technical 
Specialist for the American Museum of Natural History in New York from 2002–2005. 
 1 See 1 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 1.01 (2006). 
 2 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
 3 35 U.S.C. § 271(f). 
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electrical components, but courts have had difficulty applying the 
statute to intangible components such as software.  In today’s 
global market, the U.S. software industry is increasingly reliant on 
foreign sales to stay competitive, and so judicial interpretation of 
extraterritorial protection has become a significant concern for the 
industry.4 
Part I of this Comment sets forth the history and case law 
surrounding § 271(f) of the Patent Act.  Part II addresses the 
application of § 271(f) on software patents and the relevant case 
law up to and including the recent Supreme Court case, Microsoft 
Corp. v. AT&T Corp.  Part III discusses the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of § 271(f) in Microsoft, arguing four points.  First, 
that software, whether tangible or not, satisfies the definition of 
component.  Second, that extending protection to software supplied 
abroad would not lead to insurmountable damage awards.  Third, 
that leaving the matter for foreign tribunals to resolve would be 
precarious as the results would vary dramatically from country to 
country, and finally, that a ruling in favor of AT&T would likely 
have been beneficial for the U.S. software industry. 
I. THE ADVENT & HISTORY OF § 271(f) 
In June of 1967, two Louisiana companies triggered a dispute 
that would eventually give rise to the new subsection (f) of § 271.5  
Laitram Corporation (“Laitram”), the inventor of a revolutionary 
shrimp-peeling machine, sued Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. 
(“Deepsouth”), a competitor in the shrimp packaging industry.6  
Laitram accused Deepsouth of infringing two of their patents.7  
These two patents, ‘218 and ‘927, were directed to machines used 
 
 4 See Court Will Hear Microsoft Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2006, at C2. 
 5 Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc., 310 F. Supp. 926 (D.C. La. 1970); 
130 CONG. REC. H10525, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827 (“This proposal responds 
to the United States Supreme Court decision in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram 
Corp. . . . .”). 
 6 Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1037, 1037–46 (D.C. 
La. 1969); see also Laitram Corporation, http://www.laitram.com (last visited Nov. 15, 
2007). 
 7 See Laitram Corp., 301 F. Supp. at 1037–46. 
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for removing the veins from the backs of peeled shrimp.8  The ‘218 
patent disclosed a single embodiment of a “slitter” for cutting the 
backs of the shrimp, exposing the veins for removal,9 while the 
‘927 patent disclosed apparatus for removing the exposed vein.10  
Deepsouth was not only selling these machines domestically, but 
was also exporting the components of the patented inventions for 
assembly abroad.11 
Laitram sought an injunction claiming that § 271(a) of the 
Patent Act should not only hold Deepsouth liable for domestic 
infringement but should be interpreted to cover this “underhanded” 
tactic of exporting individual components.12  The statute provides 
for liability if someone “makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any 
patented invention, within the United States or imports into the 
United States any patented invention . . . .”13 
Deepsouth argued that a face value reading of § 271(a) did not 
cover their exportation practices.14  However, Laitram wanted the 
court to extend the protection afforded to “patented inventions” to 
include components of those inventions, even if by themselves 
they might not infringe.15 
While finding Deepsouth liable for domestic infringement 
under § 271(a) of the Patent Act, the court was not convinced of 
Laitram’s arguments and found that U.S. patent laws only covered 
domestic infringement.16  Reviewing the pertinent case law, the 
court stated that “a combination claim of a United States patent is 
not infringed absent presence of the combination in assembled 
form within the United States.”17 
Laitram appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the 
district court ruling.  The circuit court found that in § 271(a), the 
 
 8 See id. 
 9 See id. at 1040–42. 
 10 See id. at 1051. 
 11 Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc, 443 F.2d 936, 937 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 12 Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc., 310 F. Supp. 926, 926 (E.D. La. 
1970). 
 13 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
 14 Laitram Corp., 310 F. Supp. at 926. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 929. 
 17 Id. at 928 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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word “makes” should not be given a technical construction, but 
rather understood by its ordinary meaning.18  The court held that 
when all the parts of a patented machine are produced in the 
United States and that the final assembly abroad is only a minor 
aspect of the manufacturer, then the machine is “made” within the 
United States.19  This ruling gave an entirely new reading of § 
271(a) and was immediately appealed by Deepsouth to the United 
States Supreme Court. 
On May 30, 1972, the Supreme Court decided by a 5–4 
majority to reverse the Fifth Circuit’s decision.20  Justice White, 
writing for the majority, held that § 271(a) did not cover this 
particular practice of exporting the components of a patented 
device.21  The Court stated, “[w]e cannot endorse the view that the 
‘substantial manufacture of the constituent parts of [a] machine’ 
constitutes direct infringement when we have so often held that a 
combination patent protects only against the operable assembly of 
the whole and not the manufacture of its parts.”22  The Court noted 
that what was at stake was the right of American companies to 
compete with an American patent holder in foreign markets, and 
that the Court would require a clear signal from Congress before 
approving the position of a company such as Laitram.23 
Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent, foresaw that the 
majority’s result would unduly reward “the artful competitor who 
uses another’s invention in its entirety and who seeks to profit 
thereby.”24  The minority’s analysis hinged on the fact that 
“everything was accomplished in this country except putting the 
pieces together as directed” and that this subverts “the 
Constitutional scheme of promoting the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts . . . .”25 
 
 18 Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc., 443 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 19 See id. at 939. 
 20 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 534 (1972). 
 21 Id. at 528. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See id. at 531. 
 24 Id. at 532–33. 
 25 Id. at 533–34. 
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The cases immediately following the decision applied the 
Supreme Court’s ruling.  In John Mohr & Sons v. Vacudyne Corp., 
the district court held that if an inventor desired patent protection 
in markets other than the United States, then Congressional intent 
commanded this protection be obtained in those markets.26 
In Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., the infringing 
party, relying on Deepsouth as precedent, argued that its foreign 
sales should be excluded from the damages calculations because 
their infringing products were not placed in truck assemblies in this 
country.27  But the district court declined to interpret Deepsouth so 
narrowly.  Instead, relying on the statutory language of § 271(a), 
the court found an infringement because the manufacturing of the 
entire patented invention had taken place within the United 
States.28 
Twelve years later, in 1984, with little forewarning Congress 
introduced an amendment to the Patent Act of 1952 that would 
“close a loophole” that was created as a result of Deepsouth.29  The 
amendment was § 271(f), which put forth two propositions.30  The 
first, § 271(f)(1) stated that: 
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be 
supplied in or from the United States all or a 
substantial portion of the components of a patented 
invention, where such components are uncombined 
in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively 
induce the combination of such components outside 
of the United States in a manner that would infringe 
the patent if such combination occurred within the 
United States, shall be liable as an infringer.31 
The second, § 271(f)(2) stated that: 
 
 26 John Mohr & Sons v. Vacudyne Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1113, 1116 (N.D. Ill. 1973). 
 27 Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 579 F. Supp. 353, 375 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
 28 Id. at 376. 
 29 See generally, 130 CONG. REC. H10525 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5827. 
 30 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) outlines infringement liability of patents.  The statute 
currently includes subdivisions (a) through (i). Id. 
 31 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1). 
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Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be 
supplied in or from the United States any 
component of a patented invention that is especially 
made or especially adapted for use in the invention 
and not a staple article or commodity of commerce 
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where 
such component is uncombined in whole or in part, 
knowing that such component is so made or adapted 
and intending that such component will be 
combined outside of the United States in a manner 
that would infringe the patent if such combination 
occurred within the United States, shall be liable as 
an infringer.32 
The Congressional record contains very little information 
regarding the enactment of § 271(f).33  The statute was but one of a 
handful of additions Congress made to the Patent Act of 1954 and 
was considered an addition that would “prevent copiers from 
avoiding U.S. patents by supplying components of a patented 
product in this country so that the assembly of the components 
may be completed abroad.”34  Likely lobbying groups could have 
been U.S. manufacturers who were concerned with the possibility 
of overseas patent infringement; however, Congressman 
Kastenmeier, who introduced the statute, left no record of what 
transpired.35 
After the introduction of § 271(f), courts began to apply the 
added patent protection that the statute provided U.S. 
manufacturers.  But, the few courts that were presented with § 
271(f) arguments grappled with the ambiguity of the statute’s 
language when trying to determine whether extraterritorial patent 
protection existed. 
 
 32 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2). 
 33 See generally 130 CONG. REC. H10525 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5827. 
 34 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5828. 
 35 See Telephone Interview with Congressman Robert Kastenmeier, on file with author 
(June 1, 2007). 
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From 1984 to 2000, § 271(f) arguments were presented in only 
twenty-four cases.36  Of these, many courts were reluctant to attach 
liability.  For example, the Southern District of New York denied 
the application of § 271(f) because the defendant’s products were 
first manufactured abroad and only stored in the United States 
before export to Canada.37  The only situations where courts felt 
comfortable attaching liability were in the handful of cases that 
presented facts precisely analogous to Deepsouth.38 
But by the turn of the century, the global software market, 
fueled by the dot-com industry, had created a surge in new patent 
litigations.39  The holdings of these cases have been inconsistent, 
creating a great deal of uncertainty for the software industry.  The 
following section examines these cases and the arguments put forth 
by stakeholders in the software industry. 
II. TREATMENT OF SOFTWARE UNDER § 271(f) 
As discussed above, § 271(f) was designed to protect U.S. 
manufacturing interests.  In 1984, the year the statute was 
introduced, the overwhelming majority of U.S. manufacturing 
consisted of tangible products such as automobiles and, in the case 
of Deepsouth, shrimp-peeling machines.40  But in the last twenty 
years, U.S. manufacturing has changed significantly.  The U.S. 
economy has shifted from tangible products to intangibles such as 
services and software.  In 1996, the U.S. software market 
accounted for over 77% of the market worldwide.41  Likewise, this 
 
 36 Lexis and Westlaw search results of § 271(f) provide twenty-four hits. 
 37 See Windsurfing Int’l v. Fred Ostermann GmbH, 668 F. Supp. 812, 820–21 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 38 See, e.g., T.D. Williamson, Inc. v. Laymon, 723 F. Supp. 587, 593 (N.D. Okla. 1989) 
(finding liability where the defendant had shipped all components of an infringing device 
from Oklahoma to Venezuela for assembly abroad). 
 39 From 2000 to 2007, over forty-five cases involving § 271(f) have been filed in 
federal courts. 
 40 See Highdeal, Inc., Overcoming the Profit Challenge in an Intangible Economy 
(2002), http://www.tmforum.org/browse.aspx?catID=884&linkID=25404&docID=1423. 
 41 See Press Briefing, Stanford Univ., The US Domination Of Worldwide Software 
Products Sales Increased in 1995 (Oct. 17, 1996), available at http://www.stanford.edu/ 
group/scip/avsgt/usmktshare1096.pdf. 
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shift in the economy created a burden on the courts to address the 
problematic area of software patents under § 271(f). 
First, there is an intense debate over whether software should 
even be granted patent protection.42  However, in 1981 the 
Supreme Court in Diamond v. Diehr held that a device using 
computer software, which was an integral part of the device, was a 
patentable object.43  The Court stated that while software 
algorithms themselves may not be patented, devices that utilized 
them may.44 
This less than clear decision led to a substantial increase in 
software patents being granted by the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office and a host of litigations challenging the validity 
of such patents.45  Further confusion arose on how § 271(f) applied 
to software patents.  The key language of § 271(f) discusses 
“components” being “supplied” abroad.  The courts were, 
therefore, left with the question of whether software code is a 
“component” of a patented device and how software must be 
“supplied” to create an infringement.46 
In a series of cases after 2000, the Federal Circuit looked to 
address some of these issues and fashion some guidelines for 
which the industry could follow.  The Federal Circuit in Pellegrini 
v. Analog Devices, Inc. held that computer chips designed in the 
United States but manufactured abroad did not infringe a patent 
under § 271(f) because the chips themselves were never made, 
 
 42 See Philip H. Albert, Lowering the Volume in the Software Patent Debate, 
LINUXINSIDER, Mar. 15, 2005, http://www.linuxinsider.com/story/41376.html; see also 
Graham Bowley, In Decisive Vote, EU Rejects Law on Software Patents, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., July 7, 2005, at 13 (describing the fierce debate taking place in the European 
Union). 
 43 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). 
 44 Id. at 186. 
 45 For example, a search of the USPTO database for patents listed under the 
specification “software” issued in 1980 found 464 patents granted while the same 
specification found 3,027 patents granted in 1990. See U.S. Patent and Full-Text Image 
Database, http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 
2007) (results were found using the search term “spec/software” and limiting results by 
the appropriate date ranges); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting the 
number of cases filed). 
 46 See Virginia Zaunbrecher, Eolas, AT&T, & Union Carbide: The New 
Extraterritoriality of U.S. Patent Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 33, 37–40 (2006). 
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used, or sold in the United States or physically “supplied” from the 
United States.47  The court held that under § 271(f)(1) there is no 
liability “unless components are shipped from the United States for 
assembly.”48  The court added that “‘[s]upplying or causing to be 
supplied’ in § 271(f)(1) clearly refers to physical supply of 
components, not simply to the supply of instructions . . . .”49  This 
interpretation of § 271(f) created a presumption that § 271(f) did 
not apply to software. 
But that holding did not last long.  The following year, the 
Federal Circuit in Eolas Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. held 
that software code written in the United States and sent abroad on 
“golden master disks” for use abroad did infringe a U.S. patent 
because the code qualified as a “component” of a patented 
invention under § 271(f).50  The Eolas court held that the language 
of § 271(f) did not limit itself to machines or physical structures, 
but included all forms of invention eligible for patenting.51  The 
court reasoned that software was much more than merely a set of 
instructions, instead software code “is probably the key part of this 
patented invention.”52 
The Federal Circuit Court extended this holding the same year 
(over a dissent) in AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., finding that 
master copies of software sent abroad may be deemed “supplied” 
from the United States for purposes of § 271(f).53 
These three cases, Pellegrini, Eolas and AT&T, were seen as 
being at odds with each other and were widely criticized by the 
software industry.54  In NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., the 
Federal Circuit once again was presented with the question of 
extraterritorial patent rights for software.55  In an amicus brief in 
 
 47 375 F.3d 1113, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 1118. 
 50 399 F.3d 1325, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 51 See id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 414 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 54 Harold C. Wegner, A Foreign Square Peg in a Domestic Round Hole, 
http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/3467/Foreigh%20Square
%20Peg.pdf (last visited June 16, 2007). 
 55 392 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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support of Research in Motion, Intel argued that “[w]hile each of 
these cases purports to distinguish the next, the ultimate holdings 
are difficult to square, and they lack a common analytical 
approach.  The Court has yet to take a consistent and holistic view 
of infringement liability in the transnational context.”56  Intel’s 
brief shows the frustration that the software industry felt with these 
inconsistent cases.  The uncertainty left many patent holders 
unsure of what protection they held and where it applied. 
The Supreme Court finally agreed to address the conflicting 
case law surrounding § 271(f) by granting certiorari in AT&T 
Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.  The case involved a patent for a speech 
codec57 held by AT&T, which was allegedly infringed by 
Microsoft’s Windows Operating System product.58  AT&T sought 
damages for every copy of Windows installed on all domestically 
manufactured computers and every copy that had been installed on 
computers abroad.59  Microsoft had stipulated to all domestic 
infringement, but moved in limine to exclude evidence of foreign 
sales in the damages award.60  Microsoft asked the Federal Circuit 
to apply the holding of Pellegrini and find that “supply from the 
United States of intangible information, such as design information 
and instructions for foreign component manufacture, cannot 
constitute infringement under § 271(f).”61  Microsoft’s argument 
rested on the presumption that the single “golden master disk” they 
had sent abroad was merely a set of instructions to be copied onto 
a foreign disk for foreign installation on foreign computers.62  
Meanwhile, AT&T—relying on the Diamond and Eolas 
decisions—argued that software was a patentable component and 
 
 56 Brief for Intel Corp. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4, NTP, 392 F.3d 1336 
(2004) (No. 03-1615), 2005 WL 4798098. 
 57 A speech codec is a software program that is capable of coding-converting a speech 
signal into a more compact code and decoding-converting the more compact code back 
into a signal that sounds like the original speech signal. Speech Coding, Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speech_encoding (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). 
 58 See AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 59 See id. 
 60 See id. 
 61 Replacement Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 3, AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 
2004 WL 4990677. 
 62 Id. at 7–9. 
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that the statutory language of § 271(f) did not limit itself to only 
machines or physical structures.63 
The Federal Circuit was persuaded by AT&T’s arguments and 
held that even though only a single copy of the infringing software 
was manufactured in the United States and sent abroad, the 
resulting copies were essentially supplied from the United States.64  
Curiously, Judge Rader, who had written the Eolas opinion, wrote 
the dissent arguing that the “copying and supplying are separate 
acts with different consequences” and that the majority had gone 
too far giving “extraterritorial effect to U.S. patent laws.”65 
Before the Supreme Court, Microsoft continued to argue their 
two main propositions.  First, that the “golden master disk” did not 
constitute a “component” of a patent, arguing that the disk itself 
was just a blueprint of the software code.66  Second, the shipping 
of a single disk (or transmission over the internet) did not 
constitute the “supply” of that component.67 
Because of the major impact the decision would have on the 
U.S. software industry, the case drew a lot of attention from 
academics and leaders in the software industry.68  These interested 
parties, including law professors, the Department of Justice, Yahoo 
and other software companies, submitted amicus briefs on behalf 
of AT&T and Microsoft, with the lion’s-share supporting 
Microsoft.69 
One such amicus brief, submitted by professors Mark Lemley 
and John Duffy, agreed with the Federal Circuit’s holdings in 
Eolas and AT&T that “software code, like any other product, can 
be a component of a patented invention,” but they argued that 
copies of a “component” made in a foreign country are not 
 
 63 Replacement Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 28, 47–48, AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 
2004 WL 4990676. 
 64 See AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1370. 
 65 Id. at 1372–74 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 66 Brief of Petitioner at 7, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) (No. 
05–1056), 2006 WL 3693463. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Microsoft v. AT&T: Extraterritorial Enforcement of US Patents, 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/05/microsoft_v_att_1.html (May 1, 2007). 
 69 Id. 
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“supplied” from the United States.70  They wrote that ruling in 
favor of AT&T “has the potential to increase dramatically the 
patent liability of U.S.-based firms and thereby encourage firms to 
relocate their research and development facilities outside of the 
United States.”71 
This policy concern was addressed in the amicus brief of U.S. 
Philips Corporation (“Philips”).  Philips argued that it is difficult to 
believe that U.S. software companies will migrate to Europe 
“where they might not be able to patent their software at all, just to 
sell a product abroad that they cannot sell in the U.S.”72  They also 
claimed that it is even less probable that U.S. software companies 
will move to countries with little or no intellectual property 
protection, such as China.73 
Oral argument was held on February 26, 2007 in front of eight 
Justices, with Justice Roberts recusing himself due to a conflict of 
interest.74  As the Justices listened to AT&T and Microsoft’s 
arguments, they grappled with the nuances of software 
technology.75  Unlike mechanical patents, software patents pose 
conceptual issues that many find difficult to comprehend without a 
deeper knowledge of electrical engineering.76  This lack of a clear 
understanding was evidenced by the Justices repeated requests for 
software analogies such as blueprints and player pianos from both 
parties.77 
 
 70 Brief for Intellectual Property Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, 
6–8, Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (No. 05–1056), 2006 WL 3740618. 
 71 Id. at 2. 
 72 Brief for U.S. Philips Corp. & Philips Electronics North America Corp. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 6, Microsoft  Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (No. 05–1056), 
2007 WL 197102. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Justice Roberts owns shares of Microsoft.  See Henry Blodget, How To Invest Like a 
Supreme Court Justice: What John Roberts’ Portfolio Reveals About His Character, 
SLATE, July 26, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2123414. 
 75 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8–9, Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746  (No. 05-
1056), 2007 WL 541886. 
 76 Is software a set of instructions that computers follow, or is software a process that 
computers talk to in order to carry out functions?  The answer is best seen in a new light, 
devoid of analogies, as software is a new medium that should be given its own category. 
 77 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, 34, Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (No. 
05–1056), 2007 WL 541886. 
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In the end, the Justices focused their questions on the supply 
issue and Justice Breyer directed his attention to the issue of 
whether or not a simple knowledge exchange would constitute an 
infringement.78 
On April 30, 2007, the Supreme Court, in a 7-1 majority, 
reversed the Federal Circuit ruling in favor of Microsoft.79  Justice 
Ginsburg, writing the majority opinion, addressed the two 
arguments put forth by Microsoft.  First, the Court held that a 
tangible copy of computer software, not the software in the 
abstract, qualifies as a “component” within the meaning of § 271(f) 
of the Patent Act.80  The Court held that software can be 
“conceptualized in (at least) two ways.”81  Drawing on yet more 
analogies, the Court held that software can be seen as either “[t]he 
notes of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony” (a set of abstract 
“instructions themselves detached from any medium”) or the 
“[s]heet music for Beethoven’s Ninth” (“a tangible ‘copy’ of 
software, the instructions encoded on a medium such as a CD-
ROM”).82 
In its only reference to Eolas, the Supreme Court did not 
exactly overturn the holding, noting that the Federal Circuit had 
not articulated whether the software at issue was software in the 
abstract, or a tangible copy of software.83 
Secondly, the Supreme Court held that § 271(f) was “not 
applicable where computer software was first sent from the United 
States to a foreign computer manufacturer on a master disk, or by 
electronic transmission, and then copied by the foreign recipient 
for installation on computers made and sold abroad . . . .”84  The 
Court’s rationale was that the “copies, as ‘components’ installed on 
 
 78 Id. at 37. 
 79 See Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1746. 
 80 See id. 
 81 Id. at 1754. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 1754 n.10.  At oral argument, Justice Ginsburg noted the ambiguity on that 
issue in the Federal Circuit’s opinion in AT&T. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 13–
15, Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (No. 05–1056), 2007 WL 541886. 
 84 Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1746. 
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the foreign made computers, were not supplied from the United 
States.”85 
The Court closed by stating that “[i]f patent law is to be 
adjusted better ‘to account for the realities of software 
distribution,’ the alteration should be made after focused 
legislative consideration, and not by the Judiciary forecasting 
Congress’ likely disposition.”86 
III. MISTAKEN ARGUMENTS & BAD POLICY 
The Justices’ dependence on analogies of dated technologies 
such as blueprints, player pianos, and sheet music, reveals some of 
the difficulties the Court had in understanding software and its 
function in a patentable machine.87  It was this confusion, along 
with various policy arguments made by Microsoft and its 
supporters, that likely influenced the Court’s holding.  The 
following subsections examine this confusion and argue four 
points: first, that software should be considered a component of a 
patented invention; second, that extending protection to software 
supplied abroad would not lead to insurmountable damage awards; 
third, that relying on foreign tribunals to resolve patent disputes 
emanating from the United States would result in uncertainty for 
U.S. software companies; and finally, that a ruling in favor of 
AT&T would likely have been beneficial for the U.S. software 
industry. 
 
A. Software is a Component 
While many argue that software should not be patentable at 
all,88 the simple fact remains that under Diamond software is “an 
 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 1760 (quoting AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1370 (2005)). 
 87 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, 34, Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (No. 
05–1056), 2007 WL 541886. 
 88 See Posting of Jabari Zakiya to Free Software Magazine Blog, Software Ain’t 
Patentable, Damn It!, http://www.freesoftwaremagazine.com/blogs/software_aint_ 
patentable_damn_it (Jan. 3, 2007); see also Posting of Dana Blankenhorn to ZDNet, The 
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integral part of a device”89 and, therefore, a component of a 
patentable object.  The definitions of software found in dictionaries 
and encyclopedias are varied and are often complicated for a 
layperson to understand.90  But most of these definitions describe 
an invention that is more than just a set of instructions.91  Indeed, 
only Justice Stevens, writing the lone dissent in Microsoft, realized 
that software was not a mere blueprint.92  Disagreeing with the 
majority’s analogy of software as a set of instructions, Stevens 
wrote that whether incorporated into a medium, or standalone, 
software clearly satisfies the dictionary definition of component.93  
Furthermore, he wrote that “unlike a blueprint that merely instructs 
a user how to do something, software actually causes infringing 
conduct to occur.”94  Justice Stevens provided his own analogy that 
software “is more like a roller that causes a player piano to produce 
sound than sheet music that tells a pianist what to do.”95  Stevens 
also drew on the statutory language of § 271(f)(2) claiming that 
software’s “sole intended use is an infringing use” and that it is 
“surely not ‘a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for 
substantial noninfringing use’ as that term is used in § 271(f)(2).”96 
Software is an integral part of any computer.  In fact, the 
software in Microsoft’s operating system, which contained 
AT&T’s codec, is perhaps the most important component of any 
computer.  To argue that software is just a set of instructions, and 
that the tangible CD or hard drive that contains these instructions is 
the integral component, is an absurd proposition.  In the case of 
AT&T’s speech codec, one could hardly argue that the novel and 
 
Real Issue in the Software Patent Fight, http://blogs.zdnet.com/open-source/?p=1552 
(Oct. 17, 2007, 08:37 EST). 
 89 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 175 (1981). 
 90 See VAN NOSTRAND’S SCIENTIFIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (Douglas M. Considine ed., 7th ed. 
1989); see also Software, Webopedia, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/s/ 
software.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2007). 
 91 See id. 
 92 See Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1763 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 93 See id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
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useful aspect of the invention is the CD the code is stored upon.97  
Software is a new and extraordinary invention, which does not fit 
neatly into any preconceptions of what a patentable object is or 
should be.  It is time to recognize software for what it is—an 
extraordinary invention for which antiquated analogies will simply 
not work. 
B. Copying of Software Abroad is Supplied 
The Court in Microsoft decreed that copies of Windows made 
abroad from a “golden disk” did not amount to supply from the 
United States.98  The Court, comparing the copying of software to 
that of key duplication, found that because “the copies of Windows 
actually installed on the foreign computers were not themselves 
supplied from the United States,” § 271(f) did not apply.99  Justice 
Alito’s concurring opinion likened the act of software supply to 
that of an author sending her manuscript to a scrivener, who in turn 
copies the story by hand into a blank book.100 
This fundamental misunderstanding of software by the Court 
and their unwillingness to provide software with its own criteria 
for supply101 under § 271(f), allowed Microsoft to take advantage 
of the relative ease of software duplication and transportation.  As 
Justice Stevens argued in his dissent, had Microsoft sent thousands 
of individual copies of Windows on CD’s, then perhaps the Court 
would have ruled differently.102 
 
 97 To be granted a patent by the USPTO, the invention must be both novel and useful.  
See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, § 2106 
(8th ed., rev. 6 2007) (detailing the authoritative reference on the practices and 
procedures relative to the prosecution of patent applications before the USPTO defining 
the applicable statutes, rules, and case law). 
 98 127 S. Ct. at 1757. 
 99 Id. 
 100 See id. at 1761 n.* (Alito, J., concurring). 
 101 Software may be supplied by means never envisioned by the authors of the Patent 
Act or § 271(f). See Brief for Respondent at 28, Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) 
(No. 05–1056), 2007 WL 186523 (providing a more detailed argument on the supply 
issue). 
 102 See Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1762–63 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Microsoft and its amici argued that to hold otherwise would 
lead to insurmountable damage awards.103  This is a view shared 
by many opponents of § 271(f) and is often cited as one of the 
main reasons why the statute should be dissolved or limited.104  
This is a flimsy argument as software companies would not face 
endless liability for infringing devices that are assembled 
abroad.105  To the contrary, liability would be determined by the 
companies’ own actions.106  If “they send software abroad with the 
intent that it be installed on multiple infringing devices, [then] they 
[would] owe damages for those devices, no more, no less.”107 
Furthermore, AT&T presented evidence in their Brief that 
refutes Microsoft’s argument of endless liability.  Microsoft 
receives a royalty for every “legal” copy of Windows installed on 
foreign manufactured computers.108  Thus, the calculation of the 
appropriate damages would be a simple percentage of those profits 
received.109  Microsoft fully acknowledges that the number of 
golden masters it sends abroad does not limit the number of units it 
supplies.110  In Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 
Microsoft argued that it was entitled to tax deductions for all 
foreign sales of software replicated from Microsoft’s golden 
master abroad, claiming that such copies were “export property” 
under the statute.111  The Ninth Circuit agreed that all copies 
created from the golden master were export property, thereby 
providing Microsoft with another $31 million in claimed 
deductions for 1990 and 1991.112  If Microsoft is able to gain a tax 
advantage for each copy of Windows that is “copied” abroad, it 
 
 103 See Brief for U.S. Philips Corp. et al., supra note 72, at 5 (arguing that the real issue 
“lost” in the pages of arguments made by Microsoft and its amici is the proper measure of 
damages). 
 104 See James Farrand, Territoriality and Incentives Under the Patent Laws: 
Overreaching Harms U.S. Economic and Technological Interests, 21 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1215, 1217 (2006). 
 105 See Brief for U.S. Philips Corp. et al., supra note 72, at 6. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 101, at 32. 
 109 See id. at 34. 
 110 See id. at 32. 
 111 See Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 311 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 112 Id. at 1188. 
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would only seem fair to attribute the copying as supplied and 
demand that AT&T receive their appropriate share of those profits. 
AT&T made this argument before the Federal Circuit and 
Microsoft responded that the “arguments regarding construction of 
the tax code are irrelevant to the proper construction of the patent 
code . . .  and ‘has no bearing on the [patent infringement] case at 
bar.’”113  The Federal Circuit did not address this issue and neither 
party raised it before the Supreme Court. 
C. Foreign Interpretation of § 271(f) 
Also in this case, Justice Ginsburg argued that patent 
infringement occurring abroad must be dealt with by the 
appropriate foreign jurisdiction and that the U.S. court system has 
no business extending their patent laws overseas.114  But, software 
patent law is non-existent in many countries, and so arguing that 
foreign patent laws should be utilized for extraterritorial protection 
is an unavailing point.115 
Yet, Justice Ginsburg’s argument is an interesting segue into 
examining how a foreign court might have ruled in Microsoft. 
While the United States has arguably the most elaborate patent 
system in the world, there has been a great deal of discussion on 
whether the U.S. model has over-extended its boundaries.116 
The international viewpoints on extraterritorial reach of patent 
laws are varied.  In the European Union, patent laws emphasize the 
non-extraterritorial nature of the protection given.117  Furthermore, 
European patent protection of software is much more limited than 
in the United States.  This lesser protection is due in part to 
 
 113 See Brief of Petitioner at 17, AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (2005) 
(No. 04–1285), 2004 WL 4990677 (quoting Prima Tek II, LLC v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 
1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 114 See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1758 (2007). 
 115 See Brief for Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, et al. as Amici Curae 
Supporting Respondent, Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 2007 WL 215264. 
 116 See Robert Pierson, Extraterritorial Reach Of U.S. Patent Law: Has The Federal 
Circuit Gone Too Far?, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 651, 692 (2007). 
 117 See Ladas & Parry, Patent Litigation in Europe, http://www.ladas.com/Litigation/ 
ForeignPatentLitigation/Europe_Patent_Lit.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2007). 
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significant public movements against big business and government 
intervention in software development.118 
This point of view is shared by some patent law academics in 
the United States.  Professor Samuelson argues that “[b]ased on 
twenty-four years of studying software intellectual property 
protection, I believe the software industry would be no less 
innovative and no less competitive in the world market if software 
patents disappeared tomorrow.”119  In Europe, therefore, a 
Microsoft type case is not likely to result in a favorable decision 
for AT&T. 
In other countries, however, tribunals examine the equitable 
principles of jurisprudence in deciding how far to extend patent 
protection. 
In Japan, while there is no specific statute or case on point, in 
Canon Inc. v. Recycle Assist Co., the Japanese High Court 
addressed the issues of patent protection for export items.120  The 
Court held that the refilling of a patented item for sale overseas 
was an infringement, even though the refilling took place in 
China.121  Recycle Assist had collected used Canon ink cartridges, 
which had been legally sold in Japan and overseas by Canon or its 
licensee, and shipped them to China.122  In China, the cartridge’s 
ink tank was reconditioned by cleaning and refilling it with ink.  
Recycle Assist then imported and sold the reconditioned Canon ink 
cartridges in Japan and overseas.123  The High Court held that the 
act of refilling the cartridges with ink was an essential element 
recited in the claims, which related to the technical idea of the 
patented invention and was therefore an infringement.124  The 
 
 118 See Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure, Patentability and Democracy in 
Europe, http://eupat.ffii.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2007).  But see Astron Clinica Ltd. v. 
Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks, (2008) EWHC 85 (pat) (where 
a U.K. court recently held that software programs should in principle be patentable). 
 119 Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: Software Patents and the Metaphysics of 
271(f), 50 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 15, 19 (2007). 
 120 See Canon Inc. v. Recycle Assist Co., Ltd., 1922 Hanrei Jiho 30 (Sup. Ct., Jan. 31, 
2006). 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
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Court held that the products sold in Japan infringed Canon’s 
patent.125 
If Microsoft were to come before the Japanese High Court, one 
could foresee the court finding for AT&T.  The Court’s decision in 
Canon reveals an equitable layer of jurisprudence that goes beyond 
mere statute.  Microsoft was found, after all, to have infringed 
AT&T’s patent with each copy of its Windows software sold in the 
United States and therefore intent to infringe abroad is arguably 
present. 
The Federal Court of Australia addressed a similar situation 
after infringing goods were exported to Papua New Guinea to 
avoid seizure by the government.126  In discussing the court’s 
jurisdiction, the court acknowledged that their Patent Act contains 
no express power to order such seizure.127  The court then stated, 
“it is not disputed that the Court has general power to make the 
order in accordance with established principles of equitable 
relief.”128  Furthermore, “the powers possessed by courts with 
equitable jurisdiction for the enforcement of their orders are . . . as 
wide . . . as the occasion at hand may require.”129  The court held 
that the respondents should not be allowed to “gain a benefit” by 
“sneaking” the goods out of the jurisdiction.130  On the other hand, 
the court found that “the presence of the products in Papua New 
Guinea [did] not place the rights of the [patent holder] at risk and 
in need of protection.”131  One can infer that if the Federal Court of 
Australia were presented with the facts of Microsoft, it would rule 
in AT&T’s favor.  As in Japanese jurisprudence, the Australian 
court seems to be making a decision based on equitable principles 
rather than statutory interpretation. 
While both the Japanese and Australian decisions fall short of 
the broad protection § 271(f) offers a U.S. patent holder, the 
 
 125 Id. 
 126 See Roussel Uclaf v. Pan Labs. Pty Ltd. (1994) 51 F.C.R. 316 (Austl.). 
 127 Id. at 319. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 321 (quoting I C F  SPRY, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITABLE REMEDIES 361–68 (4th ed. 
1990)). 
 130 Id. at 320. 
 131 Id. 
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judicial intent to go beyond mere statutory interpretation is clear.  
Microsoft did stipulate to infringing a patent held by AT&T, and 
so based purely on fairness, Microsoft should be liable for all 
infringing sales. 
D. Damage to the Software Industry 
In the end, the Court could have made arguments favoring 
either side of the component and supply debate, as the Federal 
Circuit did.  The Court’s decision was, therefore, likely influenced 
by the underlying policy arguments discussing the effect one 
holding would have on the software industry.  While the outcome 
of Microsoft is certain to have an effect on the software industry, it 
is difficult to predict to what extent (or degree) the U.S. software 
industry will suffer.  Many critics of the Federal Circuit’s decision 
believe the U.S. software industry would have suffered if 
Microsoft had lost.  One such critic, James Farrand, argues that if 
the Supreme Court had affirmed the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of § 271(f), U.S.-based software companies would 
be tempted to move their research and development overseas in 
order to avoid the “perverse” effects of § 271(f) infringement.132 
As Philips pointed out in its amicus brief, this is a flawed 
argument.133  Software companies, like all U.S. companies, would 
have benefited from the added patent protection § 271(f) can 
provide.134  While a ruling in favor of AT&T could have provided 
an incentive for certain software companies to move development 
off-shore to avoid possible § 271(f) infringement suits, the U.S. 
patent laws are considered the strongest in the world, and hold a 
great appeal for domestic and foreign companies wishing to obtain 
patent protection.135  The Federal Circuit’s ruling in AT&T 
prevents U.S. software companies from creating “infringement 
mills” overseas that would make software available to anyone in 
the world via the web.136  The application of § 271(f) to software 
would ensure that any software development taking place in the 
 
 132 See Farrand, supra note 104, at 1239. 
 133 See Brief for U.S. Philips Corp. et al., supra note 72, at 6. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 101, at 49. 
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U.S. is immediately protected, even if the bulk of development 
occurs on foreign soil.  Interestingly, while critic Farrand argued 
that if AT&T had won, a mass exodus of U.S. software companies 
would have ensued, at no point does he claim that § 271(f)’s initial 
introduction in 1984 led to any U.S. manufacturing migration 
overseas.  In fact, most would agree that any industry migration 
over the past thirty years has been due to high corporate tax rates, 
cheap labor markets, and weak labor standards in foreign 
nations.137  Additionally, if some facets of the software industry 
were to suffer, it would only be those companies that desire to 
infringe the inventions of others.138  As Justice Blackmun stated in 
his dissent in Deepsouth, today’s result will unduly “reward the 
artful competitor who uses another’s invention in its entirety and 
who seeks to profit thereby”139 and that this “subverts the 
Constitutional scheme of promoting the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.”140 
Furthermore, software providers are moving in the direction of 
Web Services.141  Instead of consumers buying software from a 
retailer and then installing it on their home or office computer, a 
consumer’s computer becomes a portal to software applications 
that run on network servers located at a central site and are 
accessed through the internet.142  The Supreme Court’s ruling 
might have inadvertently provided the perfect incentive for 
software companies to run such servers overseas, thereby avoiding 
possible infringement liability under § 271(f).  If this server-side 
solution does take hold, it will be Microsoft, the biggest software 
 
 137 Regardless of this decision, software companies are already moving a lot of their 
research and development operations abroad, most notably to Ireland, where low 
corporate tax rates and a large technology educated work force has fueled the migration.  
See, e.g., Shelley Emling, Ireland Works to Stay in the Outsourcing Game, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., June 5, 2004, at 19. 
 138 See Brief for U.S. Philips Corp. et al., supra note 72, at 21. 
 139 See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 532–33 (1972). 
 140 Id. at 534 (quoting Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 936, 939 (5th 
Cir. 1971)). 
 141 See David Coursey, Server Versions of Microsoft Apps Speak to Web Services 
Future, EWEEK, Oct. 13, 2004, http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Enterprise-Apps/Server-
Versions-of-Microsoft-Apps-Speak-to-Web-Services-Future/. 
 142 See Web Services Tutorial, http://www.w3schools.com/webservices/default.asp (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2008) (providing an introduction to Web Services). 
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company on the planet, who lobbies Congress to extend § 271(f) to 
cover extraterritorial regions. 
CONCLUSION 
The majority’s opinion in Microsoft exposes a fundamental 
misunderstanding of software and its unique function in modern 
technology.  With Justice Stevens as the lone voice of reason, the 
future of software patent protection seems bleak.  The onus is now 
on Congress to decide whether to modify § 271(f) to include 
software or to let the industry rely on the uncertainty of patent 
protection abroad.  If software is to be afforded adequate patent 
protection, then Congress must act quickly.  Congress took twelve 
years after Deepsouth to close that “loophole,” and if Congress 
decides to wait that long again, they risk the statute becoming 
obsolete in today’s global market. 
 
